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FEDERAL LAW'S INDIFFERENCE TO HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of-this Note is to report the extent that federal law fails
to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in general housing practices
such as the sale, rental, or lease of a residence.' Many states and local
communities prohibit housing discrimination based on sexual orientation,
including Massachusetts and several of its cities and towns.2 The federal
government, however, does not explicitly prohibit such conduct. 3 Does the
federal government approve of housing discrimination based on an
American's sexual preference? 4 Or does the absence of federal statutory
protection merely reflect a bias by the country's majority against nonheterosexuals?5
Section II of the Note addresses societal attitudes towards nonheterosexuality, as well as the dynamics of the non-heterosexual American
population.
Section III(A) discusses constitutional protection from
housing discrimination. Section III(B) examines federal statutory laws that
prohibit housing discrimination. Section IV concludes with an outline of
findings and recommendations.
II. NON-HETEROSEXUALS AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST
DISCRIMINATION
Between eight and twenty-eight million non-heterosexual
Americans live in the United States, according to different surveys. 6 NonThis Note will refer to sexual preference, sexual orientation, and sexual affection
interchangeably throughout the text.
2 See M.G.L. c. 151B § 4(6) (2001) (prohibiting housing discrimination based on

sexual orientation);

CAMBRIDGE,

MASS., ORDINANCES

ch. 14.04.040 (1992) (prohibiting

housing discrimination based on sexual orientation).
4 See infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 69-86, 117-21 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 25-34 and accompanying text. This Note will employ the term
'non-heterosexual' to include gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people rather than the
GLBT acronym. See National Gay and Lesbian Task Force web site, available at
http://www.ngltf.org/issues/issue.cfm?issuelD=21 (discussing components of GLBT civil
rights movement) (last visited Jan. 20, 2002).
6 MARK J. PERRY & PAUL J. MACKUN. U.S. Census Bureau, Population Change and
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heterosexuals, therefore, represent three to ten percent of the country's
population. 7 By comparison, the lowest estimate of non-heterosexual
Americans is equal to the number of Asian Americans, while the highest
estimate of non-heterosexual Americans is slightly lower than the number
of African Americans. 8
The indefinite number of non-heterosexual Americans demonstrates
an important difference between race and sexual orientation. 9 Sexual
orientation is an invisible characteristic, unlike the visible characteristic of
race. 10 Many non-heterosexuals, consequently, are able to conceal their
sexual orientation." Notwithstanding the difference between race and
sexual orientation, non-white and non-heterosexual Americans have
encountered similar patterns of discrimination from the arguments
against
2
interracial and same-sex marriages to targets of hate crimes.1
Discrimination against non-whites and non-heterosexuals spawned
mass movements in opposition of their maltreatment.13 Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. and other activists initiated the Civil Rights Movement to
eradicate racial and ethnic discrimination during the 1950's.14 The Modern
Gay Rights Movement began after the Stonewall riots of 1969 in New
York City.' 5 Although the Gay Rights and the Civil Rights Movements
Distribution 1990:2000 Census Brief, (April 2001). The current population of the United
States is 281.4 million people. Id. The famous sex researcher Alfred Kinsey estimated that
10% of the American male population engaged in some form of homosexual behavior in his
landmark survey during the late 1940's and early 1950's. ALFRED KINSEY, SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 651 (Indiana University Press, Is' Ed.) (1948). A more
restrictive survey in 1992, however, found that lesbians and gay men comprise only 3% of
the population, or 8 million Americans. See Jonathan A. Hein, Caring for the Evolving
American Family: CohabitingPartnersand Employer Sponsored Health Care, 30 N.M. L.
REV. 19, 20 n. 15 (2000) (citation omitted).
7

Id.

U.S. Census Bureau, Resident Population Estimates of the United States by Sex,
Race,
and
Hispanic
Origin,
available
at
http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/nation/intfile3-1.txt (Jan. 2, 2001) (estimating
American population of Asian-Americans at 3% and African-Americans at 12% ) (last
visited Jan. 20, 2002).
9 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
10 See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Closet Case": Boy Scouts of America v. Dale
and the Reinforcement of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Invisibility, 76 TUL. L.
REV. 81, 107 (discussing reinforcement of non-heterosexuals' invisibility by rationale
employed by Supreme Court in Dale case).
See id. at 108-10. (citations omitted) (noting psychological effect of concealing
sexual orientation for non-heterosexuals and importance of self-identification).
12 See
FBI Uniform Crime
Reports
1991
1999, available at
http://www.hrc.org/issues/hate-crimes/background/stats/stats2000.asp (last visited Jan. 20,
2002). In 2000, 4,368 or 53.6% of all reported hate crimes were because of race. See infra
notes 26, 184 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
'4 PETER B. LEVY, LET FREEDOM RING 1-2 (Praeger 1992).
8

15 JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES:

THE MAKING OF A
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battled discrimination based on different immutable characteristics, both
movements sought equality on social and legal levels. 16 Tolerance and
acceptance of non-whites or non-heterosexuals demonstrate social17equality,
while laws prohibiting discrimination demonstrate legal equality.
An overall greater tolerance of sexual orientation is generally
prevalent in America compared to forty years ago.' 8 For example, 75% of
Americans believe that job discrimination against gays and lesbians should
be illegal. 19 As of 2000, there were 236 local and county laws specifically
protecting or benefiting non-heterosexual Americans .2
Several states
have adopted legislation prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination
in
21
public and private employment, public accommodations, and housing.
Many private companies and governmental entities offer
employment benefits to employees with domestic partners, in recognition
of the increasingly common trend of cohabitation among both heterosexual
and same-sex couples.2 2
Forty-one municipal governments have
established some type of domestic partnership registry for its constituents,
with eighty-three municipal governments offering employment benefits to
the domestic partners of their employees.2 3 In addition, seven states offer
domestic partner benefits to their state employees. 24
HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1940-1970 231-39 (1983).
16 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 64 (Penguin Group,

1964).

17 See id.
18 See Hein, supra note 6, at 19. But see Sharon D. Drieger, Fear and loathing; A

brutal murder raises concerns about violence against gays, MACLEAN'S, Oct. 26, 1998, at
78 (discussing murder of Matthew Shepard and other anti-gay incidents).
19 Thomas H. Barnard & Timothy J. Downing, Emerging Law on Sexual Orientation
and Employment, 29 U. MEM. L. REv. 555, 556 (1999) (quoting Penn, Schoen & Berland
Assocs., Inc., National Survey on Gay Rights for the Human Rights Campaign, July 29,
1998).
20 WAYNE VAN DER MEIDE, LEGISLATING EQUALITY, The Policy Institute of the
National
Gay
and
Lesbian Task
Force
1, 1 (2000),
available at
httpJ/www.ngltf.org/downloads/legeq99.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2002). The laws include
civil rights protection, domestic partnership registries and benefits, and hate crime laws. Id.
See id. at 4. Eleven states and the District of Columbia prohibit sexual orientation
discrimination in private employment, while eighteen states and the District of Columbia
offer similar laws regarding public employment. Id. Nine states and the District of
Columbia prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in public accommodations and housing.
Id.
22 See Perks Seen as Key Lure for Employees Out in the Field, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
24, 2000, at G2 (showing 47 of America's 100 best companies offer domestic partner
benefits to employees); Firms Including Domestic Partners Out in the Field, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 17, 2000, at J2 (noting 22% of companies offering domestic partner benefits in
survey compared to 10% in 1997); MARTHA L. LESTER AND JULIE LEVINSON WARNER,
Providing Domestic Partner Benefits, 159 N.J. L.J. 413 (Jan. 31, 2000) (reporting 2,856
American employers offer domestic partner benefits including Microsoft Corp., Xerox
Corp., and Walt-Disney).
2 Id. at 7. Approximately 4.5 million American couples
cohabitate as unmarried, life
partners, with one-third being same-sex. Id. The U.S. Census Bureau reported 601,209
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Homophobia, however, continues to pervade American society in
its treatment of non-heterosexuals, as well as through the creation of its
laws that affect non-heterosexual people.25 In 2000, 16.3% or 1,330
documented incidents of all reported hate crimes were based on sexual
orientation. 26 Private consensual sexual activity between same-sex adults
is a criminal offense in nineteen states. 27 Thirty-five states have adopted
some form of legislation or constitutional amendment that specifically
prevents the recognition or performance of same-sex marriages.28
Referendums in several communities threaten to repeal civil rights laws
protecting non-heterosexuals. 29 Housing discrimination based on sexual
orientation has forced many non-heterosexuals to conceal their sexual
orientation in order to obtain and remain in adequate housing.3 °
The judicial branch itself continues to exhibit animosity towards
non-heterosexuals. 3' In February of 2002, the Alabama Supreme Court
recently considered a child custody case involving a lesbian and her former
husband.32 Chief Justice Roy Moore concurred in the majority opinion
awarding custody to the heterosexual father, commenting that
"[h]omosexual conduct is, and has been, considered abhorrent, immoral,
detestable, a crime against nature, and a violation of the laws of nature and
same-sex, unmarried partner households in the 2000 Census. David Elliot, August 20,
2001, "601,209 and Counting:
Census Figures on Same-Sex, Unmarried Partner
Households
Released
For
All
50
States,"
available
at
http://www.ngltf.org/news/release.cfm?releaselD=402 (last visited Jan. 20, 2002).
VAN DER MEIDE, supra note 20, at 7. Massachusetts acting Governor Jane
Swift
received attention for her decision to extend domestic partner benefits to gay and lesbian
state employees. See Yvonne Abraham, Swift to Extend Same-Sex Benefits Limited Rights
to State Employees, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 16, 2001, at Al.
25 See David M. Skover & Kellye Y. Testy, LesBiGay Identity as Commodity, 90
CAL. L. REv. 223, 235-36 (2002) (discussing acceptable use of homophobia in politics
despite non-heterosexual acceptance in entertainment industry).
26 FBI
Uniform
Crime
Reports
1991
1999,
available at
http://www.hrc.org/issues/hate-crimes/background/stats/stats2000.asp (last visited Jan. 20,
2002).
27 See VAN DER MEIDE, supra note 20, at 14.
28 See National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Specific Anti-Same Sex Marriage Laws
in
the
U.S.
June,
2001,
available
at
http://www.ngltf.org/downloads/marriagemap060l.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2002).
29 David Elliot, July 25, 2001, "GLBT Communities Expected to face 12 Hostile
Ballot
Measures
in
Next
16
Months,"
available
at
http://www.ngltf.org/news/release.cfm?releaselD=406 (last visited Jan. 20, 2002).
30 Yvonne Abraham, Housing site urged for gay elders; Study says many face
discrimination,BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 30, 2001, at B 1, B4. Coupled with the obstacles of
adequate housing for the elderly, "men and women who came out in the 1970s and 1980s
and have lived their lives openly now find themselves increasingly dependent and fearful of
revealing their sexual identity." Id. at B 1.
31 See, Ex parte H.H., 2002 WL 227956, at *5, (Ala. Feb. 15, 2002) (Moore, C.J.,
concurring).
32 Id. at *1.
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33
of nature's God upon which this Nation and our laws are predicated.
Adoption rights, domestic partner benefits, intestacy rights, the right to
make emergency medical decisions for a partner, and palimony are other
legal issues for same-sex couples encountering staunch opposition from
various groups. 34

III. FEDERAL LAW

A. ConstitutionalProtection

1. Equal Protection: Standards of Review
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
contains the Equal Protection Clause, which states that "[n]o State shall
make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws., 35 The Equal Protection
Clause protects individuals from governmental action only. 36 Thus, the
clause does not protect an individual from purely private acts unless
a
37
special relationship exists between the individual actor and the state.
Although the purpose of the clause is to prevent the government
from treating similarly situated individuals inconsistently, the clause must
"coexist with the practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one
purpose or another, with the resulting disadvantage to various groups or
persons. ' 38 A classification is unconstitutional if it randomly burdens one
group compared to another group that is similarly situated. 39 The Supreme
33 Id. at *5. Judge Moore received national attention when he defied a federal court
order to remove the Ten Commandments from his Alabama courtroom. Daniel B.
Kennedy, Landslide into Controversy: Alabama Chief Justice Calls Homosexuality 'An
Inherent Evil,' ABA JOURNAL REPORT, Vol. 1, Issue 7 (Feb. 22, 2002). Judge Moore also
observed that homosexuality "is an inherent evil against which children must be protected."
2002 WL 227956 at *5.
34 See Elliot, supra note 9.
35 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
36 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
The Fourteenth Amendment
"erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful."
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
7 See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723
(1961) (finding
symbiotic relationship between publicly-run garage and private restaurant enough for state
action).
38 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
39 Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'r of Western County, 488 U.S.
336, 346 (1989) (discussing permissibility of states to tax classes differently if not
arbitrarily or capriciously burdensome). "By requiring that the classification bear a rational
relationship to an independent and legitimate legislative end, we ensure that classifications
are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law." Romer,
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Court has developed three separate standards of review to analyze claims
of Equal Protection Clause violations: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny
(also referred to as heightened scrutiny), and rational basis. 40
Strict scrutiny is the most difficult level of review that a law must
satisfy.4' First, the law or act must pursue a compelling governmental
objective.42 Second, the means proscribed by the law or act must be
necessary in order to accomplish the objective.4 3 The Supreme Court will
invoke this level of review only when a fundamental right is at issue or
when the law involves a suspect classification. 44 The Supreme Court, for
example, has deemed the right to vote as one of the few fundamental rights
recognized by the Equal Protection Clause.45 In addition, the Supreme
Court has determined that laws using race, national origin, and alienage are
the only classifications that merit strict scrutiny. 46
Intermediate scrutiny is less demanding than strict scrutiny, but
more rigorous than rational basis review. 47 A law or act subject to
intermediate scrutiny must pursue an important governmental objective. 48
In addition, the means of the law or act must be substantially related to the
government's goal. 49 The Supreme Court will invoke intermediate scrutiny
when a quasi-suspect classification is at issue.5 ° Classifications based on
sex and illegitimacy are the only quasi-suspect classifications for purposes
of the Equal Protection Clause.5'

517 U.S. at 633.
40 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-43 (1985) (discussing
constitutional standards of review).
41 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring). But
see Adarand Constr. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995). "We wish to dispel the notion that
strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."' Id. (citation omitted).
42 id. at 440.
43 United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 165-66 (1987).
- Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 301 (1986) (stating strict scrutiny
applies only to suspect classes or fundamental rights).
45 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (applying strict
scrutiny to validity of poll tax because of fundamental right to vote).
See, e.g. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (applying suspect scrutiny
because of race-based action); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (stating strict
scrutiny applies to national origin-based action); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 37475 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny to classification based on alienage).
47 Tuan Anh Nguyen v. United States, 533 U.S. 53, 121 S. Ct. 2053, 2067-69 (2001)
(distinguishing between degree of permissible governmental action under intermediate
scrutiny versus rational basis review).
48 City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at
441.
49 See id.
50

See id. at 440.

51 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-200 (1976) (applying middle-level review to

classification based on gender); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 465 (1988) (applying
heightened scrutiny to classification based on illegitimacy).
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Rational basis review is the least stringent standard that a law or act
must satisfy, compared to strict or intermediate scrutiny.5 2 Courts will
presume a law to be constitutional under rational basis review, so long as
the classification it employs is rationally related to a legitimate
governmental objective.53 The Supreme Court will invoke this level of
review in all instances where an equal protection claim does not involve a
fundamental right, a suspect classification, or a quasi-suspect
classification.54 A law will pass constitutional muster under rational basis
review if it has a reasonable purpose regardless of whether the law results
in some inequality upon a group. 55 A statute, for instance, that requires
state troopers to retire at age fifty invokes a rational basis review because
the right to a job is not fundamental, nor is age a suspect or quasi-suspect
class under the Equal Protection Clause.56 The statute is constitutional
because there is some slight, overall relation between age and fitness
57
despite the discriminatory effect on state troopers over the age of fifty.
2. Equal Protection: Housing and Sexual Orientation
The probability that a court will determine a law to be constitutional
varies according to the level of scrutiny applied.58 A court employing strict
scrutiny review will almost always reject the governmental classification at
issue.59 In contrast, constitutional scholars refer to the rational basis
standard as toothless because courts rarely determine a law to be
unconstitutional when applying the lowest level of review. 6° A court will
subject a housing discrimination claim based on sexual orientation to strict
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause in only one of two
circumstances: if the right to housing is fundamental right or if a law's use
of sexual orientation as a classification is suspect. 6' Also, a governmental

52 See Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53, 121 S. Ct. at 2067-69.
53 City of Clebume, 473 U.S. at 440.
54 Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (applying
rational basis review because no fundamental right or suspect class at issue).
55 Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976).
56 Id. at 313-14.
57 See id. at 314-16.

58 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519.
59 Id.

60 See Shawn M. Filippi & Edward J. Reeves, Equality or FurtherDiscrimination?
Sexual Orientation Nondiscrimination in Oregon Statutory Employment Law After Tanner

v. Ohsu, 3 Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law 269, 274 (Winter, 1999). But see
City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450 (applying rational basis review to find ordinance
unconstitutional).
61 Railway Express, 336 U.S. at 110. A court will subject a similar claim to
intermediate scrutiny only if a quasi-suspect classification is at issue. See Craig, 429 U.S.
at 199-200.
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entity must perform the alleged discriminatory act, not a private
individual.
a. Housing as a Fundamental Right Under Equal Protection
While the Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of
adequate housing conditions, it refused to recognize a fundamental right to
housing under the Constitution.6 3 Basic necessities of life such as shelter
and housing are not fundamental under equal protection because the
Constitution has no independent text creating a right to shelter and
housing. 64 Although welfare enables impoverished Americans to access
basic economic needs such as food and shelter, the distribution of public
assistance is not fundamental because it is not a substantive constitutional
right.65
Federal courts have no power to impose their views of proper
economic or social policy under the Equal Protection Clause. 66 The
Supreme Court has a duty to refrain from creating substantive
constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause.67 Thus, the
Supreme Court has found that the omission of housing from the text of the
Equal Protection Clause requires the legislature to assure adequate
housing, rather than the judiciary.68
b. Sexual Orientation as a Suspect Classification
In Bowers v. Hardwick,69 the Supreme Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee a substantive due process right
to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy in the privacy of one's
home .7 0 The Bowers opinion did not apply strict scrutiny review to the
anti-sodomy statute because the Court found no fundamental right at
issue. 7 The Supreme Court subjected the statute to a rational basis review,

62

Burton, 365 U.S. at 723.

63 Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 74; see also Jaimes v. Toledo Metro. Hous. Auth., 758 F.2d

1086, 1101-02 (6th Cir. 1985) (finding no constitutional right to furnishing of safe, sanitary,
and decent dwelling by Housing Authority).
64 Craig, 429 U.S. at 216-17 (1976) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972)).
65 Dandridge,397 U.S. at 485.
66 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970).
67 San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
33 (1973).
68 Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 74.
69 478 U.S. 186(1986).
70
71

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-93 (1986).

Id. at 190-91.
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finding a rational basis between Georgia's "majority sentiments and the
morality of homosexuality. 7 2
Bowers did not address the issue of whether non-heterosexuals were
a suspect class under an Equal Protection Clause analysis.73 Thus, the
inference is misplaced and inaccurate that the Supreme Court prohibited
the application of heightened scrutiny to non-heterosexuals in light of
Bowers. 74 Some courts, however, have interpreted the Supreme Court's
application of rational basis review to mean that non-heterosexuals are
neither a suspect nor quasi-suspect class for purposes of Equal Protection
Clause violations.75 In actuality, the Supreme Court has never addressed
whether non-'heterosexuals as a class are suspect under the Equal
Protection Clause.76

The Supreme Court has enunciated various considerations for a
group to be recognized as a suspect or quasi-suspect class. 77 One example
where the Court has applied strict scrutiny is to a law that discriminated
based on immutable characteristics, such as race or national origin.78
Another instance of strict scrutiny's application is if the characteristic
relates to an individual's ability to contribute to and participate in society.79
Other examples include whether the group has experienced a history of
discrimination and whether the group is politically powerless.8 °
The Supreme Court, however, is reluctant to recognize new suspect
or quasi-suspect classifications under an equal protection analysis.8 The
72

Id. at 196.

71 See id.
74 See id.
75 See, e.g., Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d

261, 268 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating non-heterosexuals cannot constitute suspect or quasisuspect class under Bowers); High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895
F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating homosexuals cannot constitute suspect or quasisuspect class because homosexual sodomy's criminalization); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881
F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying rational basis because constitution permits
criminalizing homosexual conduct); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) (rejecting heightened scrutiny because criminalization of homosexual conduct
passes constitutional muster).
76 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 202 n.2 (acknowledging absence of question
regarding
whether homosexuals comprise suspect class under equal protection).
77 Webster v. Reproductive Health Srvcs, 492 U.S. 490, 548 (acknowledging court's
creation of strict scrutiny to weigh and evaluate strength of equal protection claims)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
78 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)
(discussing immutable
characteristics as those beyond someone's control).
79 See City of Cleburne,473 U.S. at 441 (citing Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505
(1967)).
80 See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684-85 (observing history of sex discrimination); See
San Antonio Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 28 (failing to find political powerlessness of poor
children).
81 See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441-42 (denying heightened scrutiny to mentally
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last time the Supreme Court recognized a new classification was over
twenty-five years ago.82 The Supreme Court had an opportunity to
articulate the appropriate level of judicial review for a law employing
sexual orientation as a classification, in Romer v. Evans.83 The law at issue
was an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited the state
government from extending any special protection to individuals on the
basis of sexual orientation. 84 Ultimately, the Supreme Court struck down
the amendment on the grounds that it violated the Equal Protection Clause,
finding that the amendment sought to treat homosexuals unequally. 85 The
opinion avoided establishing a heightened level of scrutiny to laws
regarding sexual orientation by subjecting the amendment to rational basis
review. 86
B. Statutory Protection
1. Legislation Prohibiting Housing Discrimination
Deadly riots occurred during the mid-1960's in Los Angeles,87
Detroit, and Newark as a result of heightened racial and ethnic tension.
President Lyndon Johnson formed the Kerner Commission to determine a
peaceful solution to the riots in the summer of 1967.88 The Commission
concluded that one of the underlying causes of riots was the presence of
residential segregation and discrimination because of race.89 Congress
enacted the Fair Housing Act 9° (FHA) or Title VIII of the 1968 Civil
Rights Act 9' (Title VIII) in response to the urban unrest and violence, after
considering both the Kerner Report and the assassination of Dr. Martin

retarded); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313 (denying heightened scrutiny to age classification).
82 See Mathews, 427 U.S. at 505-06 (applying heightened scrutiny
to illegitimacy).
83 Romer, 517 U.S. at 631 (addressing constitutionality of state amendment
prohibiting protection based on sexual orientation).
Id. at 624. The amendment came in response to various Colorado cities that passed
ordinances prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, including housing
discrimination.
85 Id. at 635.
86

Id.

87

Jonathan Karl and Kevin Smith, Mar. 1, 1998, "30 Years After Kerner Report,

Some
Say
Racial
Divide
Wider"
available
http://www.cnn.com/US/9803/01/kerner.commission/#3 (last visited Jan. 20, 2002).
88 Id.
89 Id.

at

' 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1968).
91 See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 513 U.S. 979, 981 (1994)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (recognizing Title VIII and Fair Housing Act as different names for
same statute).
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A primary goal of the legislation was to

promote integration through open, residential 93housing patterns and to
prevent increased segregation by race in ghettos.
Two other federal civil rights statutes that prohibit housing
discrimination are 42 U.S.C. Section 198194 and Section 1982. 9' The
former prohibits discrimination in contract creation or enforcement. 96 The
latter prohibits discrimination in the exercise of
property rights. 97 Both
98
statutes apply to intentional discrimination only.
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 199199 after the Supreme

00
Court limited the applicability of Section 1981 to contract formation.

The legislatots amended Section 1981 to include the prohibition of

discrimination in the terms, performance, modification, or termination of
the contract.'10 The amendment, however,
did not expand Section 1981's
02
reach to unintentional discrimination.1
Recipients of federal funds for housing are subject to additional
statutory protections against discrimination. 13 For instance, Title VI of the
1964 Civil Rights Act'04 prohibits discrimination based on race and
national origin. 105 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973106 forbids discrimination

based on handicap. 0 7
The Age Discrimination Act' 0 8 prohibits
discrimination based on age.' °9 Consequently, most public housing

92 H.R. Rep. 100-711, 100th Cong., 2d 1988, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 1988 WL

169871 (Leg. Hist.) (citation omitted).
93 Ohana v. 180 Prospect Place Realty Corp., 996 F. Supp. 238, 240 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
See also Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 469 F. Supp. 836,
845 (D.C. III. 1979) (finding Congressional intent limiting conduct preventing racial
minorities from leaving ghettos for suburban housing).
94 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2001).
95 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2001).
' 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2001).
9' 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2001).
98 General Bldg. Contractors Assoc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389 (1982)
(requiring finding of discriminatory intent for Section 1981 violation); City of Memphis v.
Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 123 (1981) (concluding violation of Section 1982 requires
discriminatory intent or racial animus).
99 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101(2)(b), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
10o Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171 (1989) (applying section
1981 only to contract's initial formation or conduct impairing contract's enforceability).

101 See supra note 99.
102

See id.

103 See infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
104 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
1 5 Id.

"o 29 U.S.C. § 504(a).

107 Id.
'08
109

42 U.S.C. § 6102.
Id.
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programs and private landlords who accept Section 8 certificates are
subject to these federal statutes. I10
Title VIII is the most comprehensive federal statute addressing
housing discrimination."'
The language of Title VIII is broad and
inclusive, which allows housing authorities generous construction and
wide latitude to remedy discrimination.11 2 After its passage in 1968, Title
VIII prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin,
or religion, in the terms, conditions, or privileges of a housing sale or
rental. 113 Eventually, Congress added sex as a protected class in 1974, as
well as handicap and familial status in 1989.114 Although Title VIII applies
to intentional and unintentional discrimination, 11' certain entities are
exempt from Title VIII including single-family homeowners renting their
homes, owner-occupied residences with four or less units for rent, religious
organizations, and private
clubs who rent or sell dwellings for non16
purposes.'
commercial
A plaintiffs Title VIII claim depends upon his or her membership
within a protected class, in order to establish the first element of a prima
facie claim of housing discrimination.11 7 Despite the wide scope of Title
110 See, e.g., Passanante v. R.Y. Mgmt. Co., 99 CIV. 9760, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

1205, at * 18-19 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13. 2001) (discussing applicability of Rehabilitation Act to
section 8 recipients); Brecker v. Queens B Nai B'rith Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 607 F.
Supp. 428, 436 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting Age Discrimination Act's similarity to
Rehabilitation Act in Section 8 case); Caractor v. Town of Hempstead, No. 97-9150, 1998
U.S. App. LEXIS 20186, at *34 (2d Cir. June 11, 1998) (analyzing Title VI claim of
discrimination by Section 8 recipient).
11 See Groome Res. Ltd., LLC v. Parish of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 212-13 (5th Cir.
2000) (citation omitted) (quoting congressional record demonstrating FHA's intent to offer
comprehensive civil rights in housing).
112 See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1359 (6th Cir. 1995);
Epicenter of Steubenville, Inc. v. City of Steubenville, 924 F. Supp. 845, 849 (S.D. Ohio
1996).
113 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(b).
114 See Pub. L. 93-383 (1974) (prohibiting discrimination because of sex); Pub. L.
100-430 (1988) (prohibiting discrimination because someone has children or a handicap).
115 See, e.g., Huertas v. East River Hous. Corp., 674 F. Supp. 440, 454 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (holding proof of discriminatory intent not necessary for Title V1I violation); United
States v. Hous. Auth. of Chickasaw, 504 F. Supp. 716, 728, 733 (S.D. Ala. 1980) (finding
Title VIII violation despite absence of discriminatory intent); Fox v. United States Dept. of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 468 F. Supp. 907, 915 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (stating plaintiff need not
prove discriminatory acts as intentional to prove Title VIII violation); United States v.
Reece, 457 F. Supp. 43, 48 (D. Mont. 1978) (holding Title VII provable absent unlawful
intent).
116 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1) (exempting FHA's applicability to rental of house occupied
by single-family home owners); 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (exempting FHA's applicability to
owner-occupied residences with four or less units for rent); 42 U.S.C. § 3607(a) (exempting
FHA's applicability to religious organizations and private clubs).
117 Hamilton v. Svatik, 779 F.2d 383, 387-88 (7th Cir. 1985) (presenting prima facie
requirements for FHA claim).
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VIII's application, discrimination based solely on sexual preference is a
permissible practice under this statute because sexual orientation is not a
protected class. 1 8 Title VIII's failure to protect non-heterosexuals from
discriminatory treatment is contrary to the statute's assertion that it
embodies a national policy against housing discrimination.119
Legislators have attempted to expand Title VIII to include sexual
orientation as a protected class on several occasions, but none have
succeeded. 120 Currently, a bill exists in the House of Representatives that
2
would amend Title VIII to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination.' 1
Victims of sexual orientation discrimination, however, continue to develop
alternative arguments that effectively extend housing discrimination
protection to non-heterosexuals, despite sexual orientation's omission from
Title VIII. 122 The following sections display ways to avoid the exclusion
of non-heterosexuals from Title VIII protection. 123
2. Title VIII and Title VII
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII) to prohibit discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. 124 The federal government enacted Title
VII and Title VIII as part of a coordinated effort to enact civil rights laws
to end discrimination. 25 In recognition of these shared aims, several
118

See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (omitting sexual orientation from classes protected by section

regarding discrimination in sale or rental of housing).
"s' See id. § 3601. "It is the policy of the United States to provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States." Id.
120 See, e.g., H.R. 311, 106th Cong., Ist (1999); H.R. 423, 103d Cong., 1st § 2(f)
(1993); H.R. 1430, 102d Cong., 1st § 3 (1991), reprinted in 137 CONG. REc. H1728-29
(daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991); S. 47, 101st Cong., 1st §§ 7-8 (1989), reprinted in 135 CONG.
REC. S340-41 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989); H.R. 655, 101st Cong. (1989). Each of the bills
proposed to amend the FHA and Civil Rights Act to extend prohibition of discrimination
based on affectional or sexual orientation. Id.
121 Civil Rights Amendments Act of 2001, H.R. 217, 107th Cong., 1st. U.S. Rep.
Edolphus Towns of New York introduced the bill on January 3, 2001, where it was referred
to the House Judiciary Committee and House Education and the Workforce Committee. Id.
The only major activity to occur since then was the House Judiciary Committee's referral of
the bill to the Subcommittee on the Constitution on February 12, 2001 and to the
Subcommittee on the Employer-Employee Relations on March 2, 2001, available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:HR00217:@@@X
(last visited Jan. 20,
2002). Not only is the 1999 version of this bill identical in text, but it traveled a similar
path from committee to subcommittee before failing to pass. H.R. 311, 106th Cong., 1st
(1999).
122 See id.
123 See discussion infra Parts I.B.2-3.
124 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
125 Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir.
1988). See also Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (prohibiting discrimination in
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courts have "been willing to import doctrines or interpretations of language
' 26
accepted under Title VII to Title VIII claims."'
a. Sexual Harassment
A sexual harassment claim is actionable under both Title VII and
Title VIII. 127 Although the conduct prohibited by Title VII in employment
is virtually identical to conduct prohibited by Title VIII in housing, Title
VIII claims of sexual harassment are less common than Title VII sexual
harassment claims. 128 Courts deciding sexual harassment claims under
Title VIII, therefore, have relied
upon the precedent and analysis of similar
29
Title VII cases for guidance.
Title VII prohibits employers from harassing employees because of
his or her sex. 130 Courts have recognized two types of sexual harassment
claims under Title VII: quid pro quo or hostile environment. 131 In the
context of housing, an example of a quid pro quo claim may involve a
tenant who shows that a landlord conditioned housing benefits, such as32
timely repairs or continued occupancy, on the provision of sexual favors.'
A hostile environment claim requires the aggrieved party to show that the
alleged harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of tenancy and to create an abusive living environment. 33 A
prima facie claim of sexual harassment requires a plaintiff to prove that the
request (if quid pro quo) or the harassment (if
hostile environment) was
34
unwelcome and because of the plaintiff's sex.

wages based on gender); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq,
(prohibiting discrimination in employment based on age).
126 Williams v. Poretsky Mgmt., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 490, 495 (D. Md. 1996).
127 Id.
128 See David J.Stephenson, Jr., Actions Under FairHousing Act (42 U.S. C.A ss 3601
et seq.), Based on Sexual Harassmentor Creationof Hostile Environment, 144 A.L.R. FED.

595, 595 (1998).

129 See Reeves v. Carrollsburg Condo. Unit Owners Assoc., 1997
WL 1877201 , at *5
(D.D.C. Dec. 18, 1997) (citations omitted); See also Williams v. 5300 Columbia Pike
Corp., 891 F. Supp. 1169, 1178 (E.D. Va. 1995). "In evaluating Fair Housing Act claims,
courts employ the same method of analysis used in Title VII employment discrimination
claims." Id.
'30 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
131 Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee,
682
F.2d 897, 908 n.18 (11 th Cir. 1982).
132 See Grieger v. Sheets, 689 F. Supp. 835, 837 (N.D. I1. 1988), related reference,
Grieger v. Sheets, 1989 WL 38707, at *1 (N.D. Ill., Apr. 10, 1989).
133See Williams, 955 F. Supp. at 496.
134 Shellhammer v. Lewallen, I Fair Housing-Fair Lending (P-H) § 15,472 at 16,129
(W.D. Ohio 1983) (examining quid pro quo harassment); Meritor v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
64-65 (1986) (examining hostile environment harassment).
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b. Sexual Orientation Harassment as Sexual Harassment
Title VII and Title VIII prohibit discrimination because of sex, but
omit sexual orientation from their list of protected classes.135 A gay male
plaintiff claimed that his employer terminated him because he wore an
earring in the 1979 case of Desantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.' 36 The
plaintiff argued that his termination violated Title VII because of a genderbased "stereotype
that a male should have a virile rather than an effeminate
37
appearance."
The Ninth Circuit concluded that discrimination based on
effeminacy is not within Title VII's purview because the statute omits such
a classification, in addition to homosexuality and transsexualism. 138 The
court relied on the absence of any amendments to Title VII that include
sexual orientation as a protected class. 139 The Ninth Circuit observed that
the plaintiffs argument attempted to "bootstrap" sexual orientation within
the umbrella of sex as a protected class, stating that sex discrimination
applies to gender discrimination only and should not extend to include
sexual preference.140 After Desantis, other federal courts considered
subsequent Title VII arguments based on a failure to conform to gender
stereotypes. 4 1 The opinions did not break from Desantis' precedent,
interpreting the legislative intent of the term "sex" as within
the context of
42
biological male or female rather than sexual orientation.
In 1989, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of sexual
43
stereotypes again in the landmark case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 1
The plaintiffs employer denied her partnership in part because she was
"macho" and "masculine."' 44 One partner suggested that the plaintiff
should walk, talk, and dress more femininely by styling her hair and
wearing make-up and jewelry. 145 The Supreme Court stated that if an
131 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(a)(l); Civil Rights Amendments Act of
2001, H.R. 217,
107th Cong., 1st. The bill proposing modification of Title VIII to prohibit housing
discrimination based on sexual orientation also proposes modification of Title VII to
prohibit employment discrimination based on sexual orientation. See id.
136 Desantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir. 1979).

137Id.
118

1978)).
139

Id. at 332 (citing Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 326-27 (5th Cir.

See id. at 329.

140Desantis,608 F.2d at 329-30.
141 See Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. and Health Care Ctr., 224 F.3d
701, 704 (7th Cir.
2000) (citing Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984)). See
also Monitor v. Chicago, 653 F. Supp. 1294, 1300 (N.D. 111.1987); Carreno v. Local Union
No. 226, No. 89-4083, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13817, at *9 (D. Kan. Sept. 27, 1990).

142

See id.

143490 U.S. 228 (1989).
'44 Id.
145 Id.

at 235.
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employer acts on the basis of a sex stereotype, the employer has acted on
the basis of gender. 146 The employer's behavior violated Title VII because
Congress intended to prohibit disparate treatment of men and women,
including treatment resulting from stereotypes based on sex. 147 The
decision resurrected the previously unsuccessful argument in Desantis that
Title VII prohibited
discrimination based on a failure to conform to a
148
gender stereotype.
Despite the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse finding
that discrimination based on a gender stereotype nonconformity violated
Title VII, federal circuits disagreed on whether Title VII applied in a
sexual harassment case where the harasser and victim were of the same
sex. 149 In 1998, the Supreme Court clarified the discrepancy when it
decided Oncale v. Sundower,150 recognizing same-sex sexual harassment as
an actionable claim under Title VII. 15 1 Thus, sexual harassment is
actionable under Title VII or Title VIII
whether the alleged harasser and
152
victim are the same or a different sex.
The Supreme Court does not require a plaintiff alleging same-sex
sexual harassment to prove that the harasser is homosexual or motivated by
sexual desire. 153 Instead, the plaintiff "must always prove that the conduct
at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, 'but
154
actually constituted 'discriminat[ion] ...because of ... sex."
Accordingly, both heterosexual and non-heterosexual victims of
harassment may argue successfully that discriminatory treatment occurred
because of a harasser's belief 5that
the victim did not conform to the
5
1
gender.
her
or
his
of
stereotypes
'46

Id. at 250.
251.

'41 Id. at
148 See,

e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1505 (M.D.
Fla. 1991) (finding Title VII violation where sexual stereotyping of workplace unfairly
burdened women); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001)
(overruling previous Desantis holding regarding failure to conform to sexual stereotype as
Title VH violation); Centola v. Potter, 2002 WL 122296 , at *4 (D. Mass. Jan. 29, 2002)
(finding discrimination because of gender stereotypes involving sexual orientation).
149 See, e.g., Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Amer., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir.
1994)
(precluding Title V1I sexual harassment claim because victim and harasser were same sex);
McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 (4th Cir. 1996)
(recognizing Title VII same-sex sexual harassment claim if harasser was homosexual); Doe
v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 575 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding Title VII same-sex
harassment so long as harassment's nature was sexual).
150 Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998).
151
152
153

Id.

Id.

Id. at 80.

154 Id. (quotations

in original).
See Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 264 (3d Cir.
2001) (recognizing gender stereotype conformity discrimination violates Title VH's
"because of sex" clause).
155
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Hamner v. St. Vincent Hospital156 and Ianetta v. Putnam
Investments 157 are two post-Oncale cases involving Title VII same-sex
sexual harassment claims in the federal District of Massachusetts. 58 The
decisions illustrate the fine distinction between harassment "because of
sex" and harassment based on sexual orientation. 159 In both cases, the
plaintiffs were gay men who alleged sexual harassment by their male
supervisors. 160 The plaintiff in Hamner described how his supervisor
"refused to acknowledge or communicate with him, screamed at him
during telephone conversations, and harassed him by lisping, flipping his
wrists, and making jokes about homosexuals."' 161 The plaintiff in Ianetta
alleged that his supervisor "twice called him a 'faggot,' singled him out,
and treated him differently."'' 62 The district
court found harassment
63
because of sex in Ianetta, but not in Hamner.'
In Hamner, the court found that the supervisor's jokes and imitative
mannerisms were directed at Hamner's homosexuality, while his other
unprofessional conduct was merely general harassment. 64 The plaintiff
testified to his belief that no difference exists between sex and sexual
orientation. 165 Hamner argued also that his supervisor's homophobic
actions constituted sexual harassment.166 The opinion concluded that
Hamner's claim did not involve sexual harassment where he failed
to
67
assert that his supervisor treated him differently because he is a man. 1
In Ianetta, the plaintiff argued that the supervisor's use of an
offensive epithet and other maltreatment was because lanetta failed to
conform to stereotypical male characteristics. 68 The employer claimed
that Hamner's precedent urged a dismissal of Ianetta's claim because his
allegations constituted discrimination because of sexual orientation, rather
than sex. 169 The court disagreed, recognizing that stereotyped expectations

156 Hamner, 224 F.3d at 703.
157 anetta v. Putnam Inv., Inc., 142 F. Supp.2d 131, 133 (D. Mass. 2001).
158

See Hamner, 224 F.3d at 703; lanetta, 142 F. Supp.2d at 133.

159 See Hamner, 224 F.3d at 703; lanetta, 142 F. Supp.2d at 133.
160
161
162
163

Hamner,224 F.3d at 704; lanetta, 142 F. Supp.2d at 133.
Hamner, 224 F.3d at 703.
lanetta, 142 F. Supp.2d at 133.
Id.; Hamner, 224 F.3d at 707-08.
Id. at 706.

164
165 Id.

Id.
167 Id. Similarly, the District Court of New York rejected a Title VII same-sex sexual
166

harassment claim where the victim's testimony revealed evidence that harassment resulted
only because of his homosexuality. Trigg v. New York City Transit Auth., 2001 WL
868336, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 20, 2001).
Mlanetta,
142 F. Supp.2d at 133.
169 Id. at 133.
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based on gender constituted sexual harassment where it was discrimination
because of sex.17 0
In January of 2002, the district court considered another gender
stereotype discrimination claim in Centola v. Potter.7 ' The defendant
employer argued that the alleged discrimination did not violate Title VII
because it was discrimination because of sexual orientation, just as the
defendant employer argued successfully in Hamner.172 The court agreed
that discrimination because of sexual orientation alone does not violate
Title VII.' 73 The opinion, however, ruled that the statute does allow
recovery in situations where a combination of a lawful and an unlawful
motive has occurred. 74 Thus, the plaintiff was able to prove a Title VII
violation under a "mixed motive" analysis to the extent that75 he proved
discrimination based on his failure to meet gender stereotypes. 1
c. Interracial Relationships and Race Discrimination
Title VII and Title VIII prohibit housing discrimination based on
race. 76 Race cannot be the sole reason to reject a prospective tenant nor
can it be part of a reason. 177 The Supreme Court has recognized that
78
whites also have standing to sue under Title VIII for race discrimination.
Title VII and Title VIII prohibit housing discrimination against
interracial couples, in keeping with the aim of Congress to redress racial
discrimination. 179 Discriminatory acts against an interracial couple violate
1

170 Id. at 133-34 (citing Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252,
261 n.4 (lst Cir. 1999)).
17' 2002 WL 122296, at *1.
172 Id. at *2.
173 Id.
174

Id. at *4.

175 Id. The court found gender stereotype discrimination in evidence that co-workers

placed a picture of Richard Simmons in pink hot pants in the plaintiffs work area. The
opinion observed a similarity where just as the plaintiff from Price Waterhouse "was
vilified for not being 'feminine' enough, Centola was vilified for not being 'manly'
enough."' Id.
176 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(e); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
177 Oliver v. Shelley 538 F. Supp. 600, 602 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (concluding Title VIII
violation occurred because of race as part of reason for housing refusal).
178 Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1972) (finding
Title VIII violation because white plaintiffs lost benefit of interracial association).
179 See e.g. Monley v. Q Int'l Courier, Inc., 128 F. Supp.2d 1155, 1159-60 (N.D. Ill.
2001) (observing courts' findings of Title VII violation because of adverse employment
action based on interracial relationship) (citations omitted); Portee v. Hastava, 853 F. Supp.
597, 611 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (upholding FHA violation where landlord refused to rent to white
woman because of black husband); Chacon v. Ochs, 780 F. Supp. 680, 682 (C.D. Cal.,
1991) (holding Title VII prohibits employment discrimination because white employee had
Hispanic husband); Bishop v. Pecsok, 431 F. Supp. 34, 38 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (noting FHA
violation where landlord refused to rent to white man because of black wife).
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Title VIII because the differential treatment is due to the difference of each
partner's race.' 80 In addition, the statutes prohibit discrimination because
of associations with a person of another race such as the race of guests or
biracial children.' 81
A party claiming interracial relationship
discrimination must prove that race was merely one of the reasons they
endured2 housing discrimination in order to have a viable Title VIII
8
claim. 1

d. Same-Sex Relationships and Sex Discrimination
Title VIII prohibits housing discrimination based on the protected
class of sex. 183 By incorporating the rationale employed by victims of
interracial relationship discrimination, it seems logical to infer that a
violation of Title VIII occurs when a person experiences housing
discrimination because of the sex of his or her partner.184 A federal district
court addressed a related claim in Braunstein v. Dwelling Managers, Inc.185
Braunstein involved four single parents who applied to live in
federally subsidized housing with their respective four children, each of
whom was the same sex as the parent. 86 The parents challenged a housing
policy whereby a parent and child of the same sex were not eligible for
two-bedroom apartments, but a parent and child of different sexes were. 87
The parents alleged that the policy constituted sex discrimination in
violation of Title VIII on the grounds that but for having the same sex as
180 See Oliver, 538 F. Supp. at 602.

See e.g. United States v. Big D Enter. Inc., 184 F.3d 924, 931 (8th Cir. 1999)
(recognizing FHA violation where landlord refused rental to white with biracial child and
black ex-husband); Woods-Drake v. Lundy, 667 F.2d 1198, 1201 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding
violation of FHA where landlord evicted white tenant because of black guests); Tetro v.
Elliot Popham Pontiac, 173 F.3d 988, 994 (6th Cir., 1999) (concluding that discharge
because of biracial child violates Title VII); Merrifield v. The Beaven/Inter-American Co.,
Inc., 1991 WL 171376, at *2 (N.D. 111.
Aug. 30, 1991) (finding Title VII violation because
of white plaintiffs interracial associations); Whitney v. Greater New York Corp. of
Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1366 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (upholding white
woman's discrimination claim where termination occurred because of social relationship
with black man).
182 See Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2000) (observing
FHA prohibits discrimination because of race).
183 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(e).
184 See supra notes 175-81 and accompanying text. A detailed discussion regarding
the similarities of arguments against interracial marriages and same-sex marriages are
strikingly similar, but beyond the scope of this note. For a more detailed discussion, see
Ron-Christopher Stamps, Domestic PartnershipLegislation: Recognizing Non-Traditional
Families, 19 S.U.L. REv. 441, 446 (1992) (comparing past obstacles preventing interracial
marriages to current obstacles preventing same-sex marriages).
a18Braunstein v. Dwelling Managers, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 1323, 1327 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
'86 Id. at 1325.
187 Id. at 1325-26.
181
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their prospective
roommate (i.e. their children), they could live in larger
88
1
apartments.
The district court rejected the discrimination claim and found no
violation of Title VIII. 189 The court determined that eligibility for twobedroom apartments depended on the composition of the family unit, as
opposed to sex. 190 The opinion noted that the procedure was neutral to
gender because it affected men and women equally.19 1 In other words, the
discrimination did not amount to a violation of Title VIII because it failed
to affect men and women disparately. 192
3. Title VIII and the ADA
Title VIII prohibits housing discrimination because of an
individual's handicap. 193 When Congress added handicap as a protected
class within Title VIII in 1989, it expressed the legislators' intent to end
the exclusion of handicapped persons from participating in American
society. 94 The legislation aimed to combat stereotypes, prejudice,
and
95
unfounded speculations associated with handicapped individuals. 1
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) pursues a similar
policy, prohibiting discrimination because of a disability by certain
96
employers, public programs, and places of public accommodation.1
There are several steps to determine whether someone is disabled under the
ADA: determine whether the plaintiff has or is regarded as having an
impairment, identify the life activity cited by the plaintiff, establish
whether the activity is a major life activity under the ADA, and determine
97
whether the impairment substantially limited the major life activity. 1
Although they use different terms of disability and handicap, the
ADA does not intend a different concept as Title VIII.198 Title VIII defines
188 Id. at 1327.
189 Id. at 1327-28.
190 Braunstein,476 F. Supp. at 1326-27.
'9' Id. at 1327.
192 See id

19' 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(l)(A). Protection extends beyond just the prospective renter
or buyer; Title VIII also protects "a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling
after it is so sold, rented, or made available," in addition to "any person associated with that
buyer or renter." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(l)(B)-(C).
194 H.R. Rep. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2nd (1988), 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173.
195 See id.
196 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 (prohibiting handicap discrimination in employment); 42
U.S.C. §§ 12131 (prohibiting handicap discrimination in public programs); 42 U.S.C. §§
12181 (prohibiting handicap discrimination in public accommodation).
197 Wilson v. Intl Bhd. of Teamsters, 47 F. Supp.2d 8, 10 (D.D.C. 1999) (citing
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998)).
198 See Support Ministries v. Village of Waterford, 808 F. Supp. 120, 130 n.4
(N.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting interest group's preference to use disability term instead of
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handicap according to the same language that the ADA defines
disability.' 99 Title ViII's definition of a handicap is one of three meanings:
a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major
life activities, a record of having such an impairment, or being regarded as
having such an impairment. 2°
Neither Title VIII nor the ADA defines specific impairments that
qualify as handicaps or disabilities.2 °' Instead, Congress intended Title
VIII's definition of handicap to be consistent with regulations issued to
implement the Rehabilitation Act.20 2 The Supreme Court has indicated that
the ADA's intended definition of disability also must be consistent with
the Rehabilitation Act regulations.2 3
The regulations of Title VIII and the ADA define an impairment in
one of the following two ways: any physiological disorder or condition,
cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting any major body
system; or any mental or psychological disorder, including specific
learning disabilities. 2° In addition, the regulations provide a representative
list of major life activities including "functions such as caring for one's
self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working. ' 205 Lastly, the definition of a substantial
limitation is where one is:
[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average
person in the general population can perform ...or ...

[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or
duration under which an individual can perform a particular
major life activity as compared to the condition, manner or

handicap) (citation omitted).
199 See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (defining handicap); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(a) (defining
disability). The ADA, in turn, defines disability according to the definition of a
"handicapped person" under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 28 U.S.C. § 705(8)(b).
200 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(1). The definition of handicap also encompasses individuals
with a "record of such impairment," in addition to those who are "regarded as having such
an impairment." Id. at § 3602(h)(3).
o See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq; 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq.
202 H.R. Rep. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2nd (1988), 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173.
203 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638.
204 24 C.F.R. § 100.201(a)(1)-(2) (2001) (defining impairment for Title VIII
purposes); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1-2) (2001) (defining impairment for ADA purposes in
employment); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1)(i)-(ii) (2001) (defining impairment for ADA purposes
in public accommodation).
205 24 C.F.R. § 100.201(b) (2001) (listing major life activities under Title VIII); 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(i) (2001) (listing major life activities under ADA in employment); 28
C.F.R. § 36.104(2) (2001) (listing major life activities under ADA in public
accommodation).
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duration under which the average person in the general
population can perform the same major life activity.20 6
The Rehabilitation Act excludes homosexuality and bisexuality as
an impairment, which precludes recognition of either sexual orientation as
a disability. 2 7 The ADA specifically states that homosexuality and
bisexuality are neither impairments nor disabilities under the statute, in
consistency with the Rehabilitation Act. 20 8 Although neither Title VIII nor
its regulations excludes homosexuality or bisexuality from its definition of
handicap per se, 2° several courts deciding claims of handicap
discrimination rely on the ADA and its relevant case law to interpret Title
VIII's meaning of handicap. 210 Thus, it is fair to infer that Title VIII
excludes homosexuality or bisexuality as an impairment under the section
defining handicap. 2t
a. "Regarded As" and HIV/AIDS
Federal courts have found HIV and AIDS to be handicaps under
Title VIII.212 Although the Supreme Court has not stated whether AIDS is
a disability under the ADA, it has determined that HIV is an ADA
disability.2 13 For example, a landlord violates Title VIII if he denies an
214
application for housing because the prospective tenant has AIDS or HIV.
The definition of handicap includes those "regarded as" handicapped.2 5
206

29 C.F.R § 1630.2(j)(l)(i)-(ii) (2001); see also, Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., v.

Williams, 122 S. Ct. 681, 691 (2002). Toyota Motor states that in order "to be substantially
limited in performing manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents or
severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most
people's daily lives." Toyota Motor, 122 S. Ct. at 691.
2 29 U.S.C. § 705(e)(i)-(ii).
0 42 U.S.C. § 12211(a).
209 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq.; 24 C.F.R. § 100.201 (2001).
210See Keys Youth Servs., Inc. v. City of Olathe, 52 F. Supp.2d 1284, 1296 (D. Kan.
1999). See also Roe v. Housing Auth., 909 F. Supp. 814, 820-21 (D. Colo. 1995).
211 See Williams, 955 F. Supp. at 495.
212 Support Ministries for Persons With AIDS v. Village of Waterford, 808 F. Supp.
120, 131 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding AIDS as handicap for purposes of Title V1);
Association of Relatives and Friends v. Regulations and Permits, 740 F. Supp. 95, 103
(D.P.R. 1990) (including AIDS as handicap within Title VI); Baxter v. City of Belleville,
720 F. Supp. 720, 729 (S.D. I11.
1989) (stating HIV as a handicap under Title VIII).
213 See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641 (holding HIV as disability, even where infection has
not progressed to symptomatic phase). But see id. at 641-42 (declining to state whether
HIV infection as a per se disability).
214

See id.

215 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999). "These misperceptions
often 'resul[t] from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of ...individual ability."
Id. (citation omitted). "Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears
about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow
from actual impairment. Id.
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Thus, a landlord violates Title VIII if he denies an application for
housing
216
because he regards the prospective tenant to have AIDS or HIV.
Neithamer v. Brenneman217 involved a prospective HIV-positive
tenant, William Neithamer, who submitted an application and a credit
report to a property owner's rental agent.21 8 Neithamer informed the rental
agent that he had a poor credit record because he had devoted his financial
resources to paying the medical bills of his lover, who had died of AIDS a
few years prior. 29' Neithamer, however, never disclosed any information
regarding his own health or sexual orientation.22 ° Ultimately, the property
owner denied the rental application. 22 '
Neithamer sued the property owner and rental agents for violating
Title VIII based on handicap discrimination.22 2 The defendants denied that
they ever knew or suspected that the applicant was HIV-positive. 223
Neithamer claimed that the defendants regarded him as handicapped
because they inferred he was HIV-positive from Neithamer's explanation
of the death of his lover from AIDS.224 On summary judgment, the court
found that the defendants knew or suspected that Neithamer was gay, but a
material disputed fact existed as to whether the defendants regarded the
applicant as HIV-positive.225
Thus, the plaintiff presented enough
evidence for a jury to infer discrimination because Neithamer was
"regarded as" handicapped.226
b. Regarded As Handicapped Because of Sexual Orientation
Title VIII and the ADA do not require an individual to have a
handicap in order to invoke a "regarded as" claim. 227 According to the
regulations, an individual may be "regarded as" having a handicap if he or
she has no impairment as defined by the code, but a landlord treats the
individual as having a substantially limiting impairment.2 28 Thus, if
Neithamer was HIV-negative, he could still maintain a Title VIII handicap
216
217

Id.
81 F. Supp.2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1999).

218

Id.

219

Id.

220

Id. at 4.
Id. at 2.
Id.

221

222
223
224
225
226

Neithamer, 81 F. Supp.2d at 4-5.

227

See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(3) (defining handicap as being perceived as having an

Id.
Id. at 4, 6.
Id. at 6.

impairing condition); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(c) (defining disability as being perceived as
having an impairing condition).
228 See 24 C.F.R. § 100.201(d)(3) (2001); 29 C.F.R., § 1630.2(1)(3) (2001); 28 C.F.R.
§ 36.104(4)(iii) (2001).
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discrimination claim so long as he was able to prove that the property
owner and rental agents regarded him as HIV-positive.229
An extended application of the "regarded as" analysis involves a
hypothetical landlord who believes that all non-heterosexuals have AIDS
or are HIV-positive. 230 A disturbing stereotype exists that presumes nonheterosexuals, especially gay men, to have AIDS or HIV. 231 It is
conceivable that a non-heterosexual victim of such prejudice could assert a
Title VIII "regarded as" handicap discrimination claim. 232 If the plaintiff
succeeded in proving that the landlord had knowledge of his or her sexual
preference and that the landlord believed the aforementioned stereotype, a
Title VIII claim seems viable.233
IV. CONCLUSION

A. Summary of ConstitutionalArguments Against Discrimination
It is unclear whether a court would invalidate a housing law that
used sexual orientation as a classification, on the grounds that it violated
the Equal Protection Clause. The non-heterosexual advocate would
certainly argue for the application of strict scrutiny because of the
increased likelihood that a court would invalidate an act. The Supreme
Court seems adamant that the right to shelter and housing, though
inherently and seemingly fundamental, is not fundamental in the context of
equal protection. Non-heterosexuals appear to have a better argument for
strict scrutiny under equal protection because they exhibit the same
characteristics of classes who have received strict or intermediate scrutiny.
Sexual orientation, for example, is an immutable characteristic like
race, national origin, and gender.234 Although the counterargument may
229
230
231

See supra notes 214-15, 226-27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 214-15, 226-28 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Centola, 2002 WL 122296, at *1 (discussing comments by co-workers to

gay employee if he had AIDS because of homosexuality); Pell v. Trs. Of Columbia Univ.,
11 N.D.L.R. 322, available at 1998 WL 19989, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1998) (discussing
lesbian's harassment claim including false statement she had AIDS); Higgins, 194 F.3d at
257 n.l (observing fellow employee's statement of aversion to homosexuals because of
AIDS fear); Sanford v. Burns, 1994 WL 267260, at 29 (H.U.D.A.L.J. June 17, 1994)
(notin 'AIDS kills fags dead' message from skinhead to gay tenant).
See supra notes 214-15, 226-28 and accompanying text.
233 id.
234 But see "ex-gay" groups such as Exodus, which promote "the message of 'Freedom
from homosexuality through the power of Jesus Christ.''
available at
http://www.exodusnorthamerica.org/aboutus (last visited Jan. 21, 2002). Ironically, two
years after appearing on the cover of NEWSWEEK for an article on the "ex-gay" movement,
former Exodus chairman and poster boy John Paulk was sighted at a notorious gay bar in
Washington, D.C. See Tough Questions for an 'Ex-Gay.' NEWSWEEK, Oct. 2, 2000
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observe that a non-heterosexual can conceal his or her sexual preference
(in contrast to race, national origin, or gender), the question remains why
someone has to conceal his or her sexual identity in the first place. The
answer is to avoid discrimination or harassment.
Like other unpopular minorities, non-heterosexuals must rely on the
judiciary occasionally, in order to compensate for political processes that
fail to protect their interests. The unpopularity of non-heterosexuals in
Colorado, for example, led to the creation of an anti-gay amendment.
Absent the Supreme Court's involvement, the amendment would still exist.
Also, a reasonable argument exists that same-sex couples' inability
to obtain enforcrable marriages deprives them from participating fully in
society.
Non-heterosexuals have been subject to a history of
discrimination, as evidenced by hate crimes and legislation opposing samesex marriages. Although United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin
Scalia suggests that gays and lesbians comprise a politically powerful
minority, 235 legislation like the Defense of Marriage Act 236 is indicia of a
contrary conclusion.
The truth remains that no court has been willing to protect nonheterosexuals on the basis that they are a suspect or quasi-suspect class
under equal protection. The influence of a conservative president over
future federal court vacancies does not bode well for any imminent
deviation from stare decisis. Rational basis review, therefore, appears to
be the level of scrutiny that courts will apply to sexual orientation housing
discrimination claims under the Equal Protection Clause.
As evidenced by federal courts' tendency to uphold laws under
rational basis review, courts rarely overturn laws under the lowest level of
scrutiny. The Supreme Court, however, struck down the anti-gay
amendment at issue in Romer under rational basis review. The decision is
encouraging because the opinion correctly found no rational relationship
between non-heterosexuality and the state legislature's prerogative to
create laws benefiting non-heterosexuals.
While non-heterosexuals can be assured that strict scrutiny will
apply in the event that a fundament right is at issue, fundamental rights are
few and the requirement of a state actor limits the Equal Protection
Clause's applicability to purely private discriminatory conduct. Thus, Title
VIII appears to be the appropriate source of protection from housing
discrimination based on sexual orientation.

available at 2000 WL 21083897.
235 See Romer, 517 at 636. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
236 See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1997).
The federal statute defines marriage as between only a
man and woman. Id. Also, it defines spouse as referring to someone of the opposite sex
only. Id.
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Summary of Statutory Arguments Against Discrimination

Congress has rightfully enacted measures to protect individuals
from potentially hostile treatment and other discriminatory conduct based
on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, handicap, and familial status,
through the passage of Title VIII. The legislation states that its purpose
was to articulate a national policy against discrimination in housing.
Congress intended to dispel stereotypes and prejudices associated with the
chosen classes, in order to prevent their exclusion from mainstream
society. Why should the same despicable conduct, then, be permissible
based solely on sexual preference?
The legislature's failure to include sexual orientation as a protected
class in Title VIII has resulted in sexual orientation harassment claims
camouflaged as sexual harassment or sex discrimination, in order to plead
a claim that conforms to Title VIII precedent. For example, one could
argue that the failure to conform to a male stereotype is exactly what
Hamner's supervisor demonstrated when he mocked the plaintiff by
speaking with a lisp and folding his wrists. The court's hands were tied
because it is not a violation of law to discriminate because of sexual
orientation, even under the most comprehensive federal laws prohibiting
discrimination.
Non-heterosexuality is a social and legal impairment in a
homophobic society that fails to offer specific legal protection to nonheterosexuals. Any argument relating non-heterosexuality to a Title VIII
handicap, however, is problematic because it is unlikely that a nonheterosexual person would want to define his or her sexual preference as a
physical or mental impairment. Such a rationale would be contrary to the
spirit of equality that non-heterosexuals seek. Further, lawyers and courts
should not stretch disability discrimination laws beyond their intended
scope just to be consistent with legal precedent.
Housing
discrimination based on sexual orientation
is
fundamentally unjust, immoral, and contrary to the principles of equality.
Discrimination because someone is heterosexual is equally egregious as
discrimination because of non-heterosexuality. The consideration of a
person's sexual orientation should be an irrelevant personal characteristic
in the decision-making process regarding the sale, rental, or lease of a
residence.
Many states and local communities have passed laws to protect
people from housing discrimination based on sexual preference, where the
federal government has failed to do so. Although we should applaud those
state legislatures, both straight and non-heterosexual Americans have the
right to rely on their federal government to adequately protect them from
housing discrimination based on sexual orientation. Congress should
include sexual orientation as a protected class in its housing discrimination
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laws, because it is clear that federal courts have deferred the issue for
resolution outside the realm of the judiciary.
Dennis M. Teravainen

